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THE CUIRRENT LAW REGARDING REDUCTION OF
CAPITAL: ITS MIETHODOLOGY, PURPOSES
AND DANGERS
It is hornbook law that an entrepreneur, in return for the limited
liability granted him through the use of the corporate form of business
operation, gives up a part of his freedom to allow the dissipation of business
property or to withdraw it for his personal use. In other words, the sub-
stitution of corporate for personal liability presupposes some assurance
of the continued availability of invested capital for legitimate business pur-
poses.' But, in contrast to statutory provisions imposing the requirement
that a specified minimum amount of capital be paid in as a condition prece-
dent to doing business as a corporation 2 and those imposing dividend re-
strictions and director liability in order to prevent voluntary impairments
of capital,3 "reduction" is a procedure whereby a corporation may volun-
tarily and lawfully "impair" its capital. 4 Nevertheless, the power to reduce
capital is viewed as a creature of business necessity, and as such is given
legislative sanction in virtually every American jurisdiction5
Reduction has been most frequent during and just after periods of
economic depression.. This is made particularly clear by the attention
given to the area by writers and the amount of litigation during the 1930's. 6
But this is not to say that the problem is unimportant today. Much con-
temporary analysis has resulted from the growing interest in the legislative
reformation of corporation law in general.7 And, although few courts in
recent years have examined the process of reduction, it continues to be a
common technique of capital manipulation.s
I See 1 HoRNsTE, CoapoRATiox LAW Am PRACTICE § 492, at 614 (1959). See
generally Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 509
(1923).
2 The usual requirement is $1000; in some states the minimum may be $500, $300,
or as little as $200. See 2 ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. § 51, 2.02(2)
(1960); 2 Occ, MODERN CoRPoRAioN LAW § 606 (1959).
3 See generally BALLANTINE, CoRloRA ioNs §§ 243-54 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Hackney,
The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARv. L. REv.
1357 (1957).
4 For purposes of this Note, "reduction of capital" will be used to refer only to
the bookkeeping transaction whereby the capital account is decreased in amount.
1See 2 ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. § 63, 2.01-.03 (1960).
6 See, e.g., Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital
Stock, 2 OHIO ST. L.J. 220 (1936) ; Legislation, 47 HARv. L. Rrv. 693 (1934) ; Note,
21 VA. L. RE.v. 562 (1935); Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 1025 (1935).
7 See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 3; Harris, The Model Business Corporation
Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1955); Kessler, Share
Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 637 (1960);
Symposium--The New Look i Corporation Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 175
(1958).
8Delaware, for example, received 151 filings for reduction during 1960. Letter
From Margaret A. Sterey, Secretary of State of Delaware, to the University of
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In considering the place and effect of reduction of capital in the scheme
of corporate business operation, this Note will examine the function
of reduction, the various techniques by which it may be accomplished, the
procedure to be followed in achieving it, and the protection offered creditors
and shareholders both by limitations on the dissipation of capital and the
remedies available once such dissipation has taken place. This will be
followed by a brief discussion of what changes might be made in the law
concerning the reduction of capital which would at once increase the pro-
tection offered to the various interested groups and retain reduction as a
workable device under corporate law in those circumstances in which its
use is justified.
I. THE FUNCTION OF CAPITAL REDUCTION
The statutory language authorizing reduction is normally-there are a
few exceptions 9 -silent on the question of what are the proper purposes
to be served by this action. In practice, reduction has been used to "un-
dedicate" a sum of money from capital and, concurrently or subsequently,
to apply it for a variety of purposes: to distribute assets to shareholders; 10
to remedy an existing deficit or capital impairment; 1  to write down or
eliminate asset overvaluations; 12 to reduce the basis for state franchise
taxes; i or to buy out a dissident shareholder faction.14 The list is not
exclusive; there are other purposes which do not have even the superficial
Pennsylvania Law Review, March 14, 1961. The Secretary of State's office was unable
to supply any breakdown by method nor was there any comparative data. Filing of
all proposed reductions is required by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244 (1953). Cali-
fornia corporations, which are required to report only those reductions which con-
template a distribution of assets, CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 1908, are estimated by state
officials to be currently submitting such plans at the rate of forty to fifty each month.
Letter From Stacy H. Aspey, Chief Counsel, Office of the Secretary of State of
California, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, March 22, 1961.
9 A number of statutes do specify that reduction may be for purposes of eliminat-
ing an earned surplus deficit or curing impairment due to losses or decrease in value
of assets. Cf. notes 94-98 infra. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-3-28 (1956) expressly
allows reduction surplus to be used in release of statutory liability of corporate
directors to creditors.
10 See, e.g., Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196 Cal. 468, 238 Pac. 703
(1925); Continental Sec. Co. v. Northern See. Co., 66 N.J. Eq. 274, 57 AtI. 876
(Ch. 1904); Seeley v. New York Nat'l Exch. Bank, 8 Daly 400 (N.Y.C.P. 1878),
aff'd, 76 N.Y. 608 (1879). The distribution may be pursuant to a plan whereby
shareholder interests are eliminated, i.e., redemption, repurchase, or release of unpaid
subscriptions. See generally Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of
Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697 (1941); Kessler,
supra note 7.
11See, e.g., Lich v. United States Rubber Co., 39 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J.), aff'd
per curiam, 123 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1941); Haggard v. Lexington Util. Co., 260 Ky.
261, 84 S.W.2d 84 (1935). For the effect of these practices in tax cases, compare
Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 214 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1954), with William
H. Haskell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 26 (D.R.I. 1950).
2 See, e.g., Jerome v. Cogswell, 204 U.S. 1 (1907). See generally Comment,
44 YALE L.J. 1025 (1935).
Is See, e.g., State v. Stewart Bros. Cotton Co., 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939);
A. B. Frank Co. v. Latham, 145 Tex. 30, 193 S.W.2d 671 (1946).




propriety of those mentioned. 15 Moreover, not only may these "proper"
purposes conceal more objectionable motives which might constitute an
abuse of the reduction process, 16 but they are subject to attack on their
face as inconsistent with the underlying theories of corporate law. For,
while there may be situations in which a distribution of assets in partial
liquidation is both financially and economically sound,17 they are excep-
tional; in most cases the distribution merely amounts to a method for
avoiding the more rigorous restrictions on the payment of dividends.' 8
The elimination of an existing impairment through reduction may have a
salutary effect on share values and may also aid in the attraction of new
investment capital, but only because would-be purchasers contemplate the
possible payment of dividends out of current earnings which would other-
wise have had to be applied to the capital deficit.' 9 And, while this result
may be desirable when a period of economic decline is responsible for the
capital impairment, it is unacceptable when the writeoff is used to mask
losses resulting not from depression but from mismanagement.20 More-
over, although the writedown of assets to reflect their actual value accords
with sound accounting practice, accounting is aimed at disclosure, while
the legal effect of asset writedown may be to free part of current earnings
which would otherwise be consumed by depreciation for the payment of
dividends.2 ' Again, although the return of previously reacquired shares
to an unissued status by retirement may remove a fiction from the cor-
porate balance sheet, it may also, in the absence of proper safeguards,
15 See Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 193 Fed. 825, 829-30, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1912)
(to gain control of management); Shaw v. Noyes, 13 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) (to avoid statutory liability to creditors).
16 See Brown v. Eastern States Corp., 181 F.2d 26 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 864 (1950); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Theis v.
Durr, 125 Wis. 651, 104 N.W. 985 (1905). Compare Small v. Sullivan, 245 N.Y.
343, 157 N.E. 261 (1927). See also Currier v. Lebanon Slate Co., 56 N.H. 262 (1875).
Compare Sander v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 36 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.J. 1940), with Kamena
v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200 (Ch. 1943), affd, 134 N.J.
Eq. 359, 35 A.2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
'7 See Irvine v. Old Ky. Distillery, 208 Ky. 414, 271 S.W. 577 (1924) (Pro-
hibition) ; Continental Sec. Co. v. Northern Sec. Co., 66 N.J. Eq. 274, 57 At. 876
(Ch. 1904) (ordered to divest shares in other corporation because of antitrust vio-
lation) ; cf. Williams v. Davis, 297 Ky. 626, 180 S.W.2d 874 (1944) (part of a plan
to dissolve). Redemption of redeemable shares also falls into this category; it is
the original understanding of investors that their shares might be retired when no
longer needed in the business. See Campbell v. Grant Trust & Say. Co., 97 Ind. App.
169, 182 N.E. 267 (1932) (shares due for call serially) ; Kraft v. Rochambeau Holding
Co., 210 Md. 325, 123 A.2d 287 (1956) (shares taken by unsecured creditors as part
of reorganization with understanding that they would be redeemed in three years) ;
Hildreth v. Western Realty Co., 62 N.D. 233, 242 N.W. 679 (1932) (redemption
pursuant to partial liquidation of business assets).
18 See Legislation, 47 HAv. L. Rrv. 693-94 (1934).
'9 Callahan, supra note 6, at 222; Hackney, supra note 3, at 1358-70, 1386-88.
But cf. DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1953) (permitting dividends to be paid out of
current earnings). See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 243-47 (rev. ed.
1946) ; 3 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATIOr LAw §§ 1305-56 (1959) (collecting statutes).
20 Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 1025 (1935), contains an excellent critique of the
problem of asset writedown and deficit elimination.
2 1 BALLANTINE, CORPORAIONS § 267 (rev. ed. 1946).
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result in the attrition of the basic investment.22 Inherent in each of these
objections is a fear of injury to both creditor and shareholder. Yet, in most
states, existing law permits these possibilities of abuse; reduction is per-
mitted whenever there is compliance with the rules of the statutory scheme.
II. TECHNIQUES FOR ACHIEVING REDUCTION
While statutes in a number of states are satisfied with a simple state-
ment that capital "may be reduced," 2 leaving the means up to the ingenuity
of corporate advisors and the supervision of the courts, others carefully
specify the techniques by which reduction may be achieved.24  Particular
methods allowed in some states may be expressly forbidden by others. The
procedure varies from state to state, and may even vary within a single
state depending on the technique followed. A method may or may not
involve a change in the share structure; it may or may not entail a dis-
tribution of corporate assets; it may combine alteration and distribution.
The simplest technique of capital reduction entails giving a new stated
value to issued no-par shares and decreasing capital by the amount it
exceeds the newly stated value.25 This possibility devolves from the nature
of "no-par" shares, and may also be explicitly permitted in a statute's
reduction provision 26 Similarly, when par shares have been subscribed
at a premium that is reflected in the capital account, or when earnings
have been capitalized, the resulting excess may be subject to reduction; 
2 7
in some states reduction in these circumstances requires nothing more
than a resolution of the board of directors.
28
There are a number of other possible methods for reducing capital.
The corporation may, by amendment of its charter, decrease the par value
of shares or redesignate them as "no-par." In many states, amendment
alone will effect the desired reduction of capital; 2 others require addi-
tional formalities like those necessary to effect the reduction of the stated
value of no-par common shares.30 Similar results may be achieved through
a pro rata exchange of common or preferred shares for a like or different
22 See Hackney, supra note 3, at 1405 (retirement by board action alone may
create a "revolving fund' for buying and cancelling all outstanding common stock).
2
-E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-149 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. §271.460 (1959).
See also CAL. CoP. CODE § 1905; LA. REV. STAT. § 12.45 (1950) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-208 (1955).24 Delaware, for example, lists twenty methods, some of which overlap consider-
ably. DzL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, §244(b) (Supp. 1960).
2 5 But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.18(5) (1956) (capital attributable to no-par
shares may not be reduced below the amount of consideration received for them).
2 6 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §244(b) (Supp. 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:11-5(d) (1939).
2 7 E.g., N.Y. STOcK Conse. LAW § 35.
2 8 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §516(a) (effective Jan. 1, 1963).
2 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 156, § 41 (1959) ; Onso REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.31,
.69 (Page Supp. 1961).
3o E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1905(c) ; Dn. CODE ANN. tit 8, §§ 242(c), 244(a)
(1953).
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number of par or no-par shares of a newly authorized class or classes. 1
Although the legal incidents of the shares may be altered, when this reduc-
tion technique is used, it is not necessary that there be any shift of power
among groups of shareholders.
Reacquisition by a corporation of its own outstanding shares is a
widely discussed and hotly disputed practice,3 2 and a comprehensive treat-
ment of this technique lies beyond the scope of this Note. It must suffice
to say that the practice, hedged with safeguards, is generally permissible
under the existing legislative mandates.P However, the effects of reac-
quisition bear so heavily on the mechanics of reduction-both in the act of
formal reduction and in the application of reduction surplus-that some
mention is unavoidable. The actual reacquisition may come about in sev-
eral ways. In most states the articles of incorporation may authorize the
issuance of a class of callable or redeemable shares, often described by
writers as "creditor shares.":14 Many preferred share contracts make
the shares subject to call at a specified price at the option of the corpora-
tion,35 usually exercisable by the board of directors 6 Even in the absence
of prior agreement, shares may be purchased by the corporation, subject to
conditions imposed by statute to protect the interests of creditors and other
shareholders W While any reacquisition other than by donation neces-
sarily decreases "capital" in the practical sense, its mere occurrence does
not, strictly speaking, cause a reduction of legal capital. However, reduc-
tion of capital by the amount which the shares represent is achieved when
these shares-now referred to as treasury shares-are extinguished, thus
removing the restriction placed on surplus when they were repurchased.38
8lE.g., DL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 244(a)-(b) (1953) (no amendment necessary) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.52(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961) (by amendment);
c f. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1905 (a) (voluntary exchange).
3 2 For a particularly fine treatment of the problems, see Dodd, supra note 10.
See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 256-63 (rev. ed. 1946) ; 6A FETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§2845-61 (1950); Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own
Stock, 15 MINN. L. R.mv. 1 (1930). A recent work in the area of repurchase and
redemption is Kessler, supra note 7 (extensive analysis of modern statutes). See
also 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5, comment (1960); 2 id. § 60-62
& comments; 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§491-97, 499 (1959);
Hacmey, supra note 3, at 1392-1402, 1405.
33 See generally BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1407-09
(1959) ; Kessler, supra note 7; Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New
Corporatio Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEm. PROB. 363, 378-80 (1958).
3 4 BALLANTqN , CORPORATIONS § 263, at 620 (rev. ed. 1946).
3See GUTumANN & DouGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL PoIicY 90 (3d ed. 1955).
36 See Dodd, supra note 10, at 724. On rare occasions common shares may be
callable. See id. at 720-24; cf. Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121
N.E.2d 850 (1954) (statute silent as to whether the shares were callable).
87Most states permit purchase out of surplus, and in some cases, out of capital;
equity insolvency is often a further check. See Dodd, supra note 10, at 704-05;
Kessler, supra note 7, at 638-44, 656-65.
38 See 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 61-62 & comments (1960)
(comparing statutes). See generally Hackney, supra note 3, at 1392-1402; Katz,
Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 764, 779-99
(1941) ; Rudolph, Accounting for Treasury Shares Under the Model Bmsiness Cor-
poration Act, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 323 (1959).
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Action by the board, when the articles so provide, is all that is needed to
effect cancellation in most states; 3 and a growing number of statutes
provide that reacquisition of redeemable shares may be tantamount to can-
cellation; the only additional step required to complete the reduction of
capital is the filing of an appropriate statement.4° To assure fair treatment
among shareholders, the statutes often provide that the shares to be ac-
quired must be chosen pro rata or by lot or be purchased on the open
market; 41 a few states, however, permit acquisition at private sale.4 2
Where reduction is to be achieved by the release of unpaid share sub-
scriptions, statutory provisions are often more restrictive.43 For example,
the legislative authorization may stipulate that the reduction shall not affect
a not-fully-paid subscriber's liability for the previously incurred debts of
the corporation." Other states permit release provided there is at least
a parity between remaining assets and any prior liquidating preferences.
45
The most elaborate protective provisions are found in Hawaii's statute,46
which requires both a one-to-one asset-to-par ratio and a two-to-one asset-
liability margin following cancellation and also calls for administrative
filing and publication-the latter of which is not required under some other
reduction techniques 4 7-- before permitting release. By contrast, Ohio per-
mits release by the board of directors when the articles so provide 48 -the
release itself effecting a reduction in capital.
49
Ill. THE MECHANICS OF REDUCTION
Statutes governing the release of capital normally prescribe a formal
procedure which includes a resolution of the board of directors recommend-
ing adoption of the proposed reduction, 0 the vote of the shareholders at a
39 See 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 62, comment (1960) (com-
paring statutes); 3 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAw §§ 1224-75 (1959) (collecting
statutes).
40 See 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 62, 2.02 (1960).
4 1 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11-5(b), (f) (1937); statutes cited note 52 infra.
The price paid is not to exceed an amount set by the vote authorizing reduction.
Compare HAWAI REv. LAws § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1960) (thirty-day option to retire
pro rata by class; thereafter corporation may accept any shares).
4 2 Eg.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244(a) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3224
(1949) ; ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, § 76 (1954); NE. REv. STAT. § 21-160 (1954).
43 See Legislation, 47 HARv. L. REv. 693, 695 (1934).
4 4 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 244(e) (Supp. 1960); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§17-3225 (1949).
4 5 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §36(b) (1957).
4 6 HAw I REv. LAws § 172-52(a), (e) (Supp. 1960).
4-7 HAW Ai REv. LAws § 172-52(d) (Supp. 1960).
48 01o RaV. CODE ANN. § 1701.14(b) (Page Supp. 1961). Compare OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1701.35(3), (9) (Page Supp. 1961).
49 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.31 (B) (Page Supp. 1961). See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. §33-351(b) (1961) (shares released from subscription shall be retired
unless certificate of incorporation provides otherwise). Note that the release is in
fact a distribution of assets inasmuch as the corporation's claim to full payment is
extinguished.
50 E.g, AL.sK CoMp. LAws ANN. § 36-2A-81 (Supp. 1958); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.59(a) (Smith-Hurd 1954).
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duly called meeting 51 -for which notice is required 5Z2_, certification by the
designated corporate officer of the financial condition of the corporation,"
filing with the state,5 and, on occasion, publication 55 and state approval.56
Under various circumstances, the statutes may permit shortcuts in
the reduction procedure, eliminating one or more steps generally required.
57
While certification, filing, and state approval, as presently used, are purely
ministerial, omission of any of the other steps seems likely to result in un-
fairness to groups having a legitimate interest in the reduction procedure.
Although it is important that the board of directors, who are normally the
group best-informed about the condition of the corporation and may be per-
sonally liable for illegal reduction,58 be represented, their approval may not
be required under certain statutory schemes.59 In view of the practical un-
likelihood that reduction will be effected without the knowledge, consent
and counsel of the board, one need not pause here. The safeguards available
to shareholders and to creditors are, however, of more moment.
A. Shareholders-Notice and Voting
Despite the importance of capital reduction to corporate shareholders,
the statutory notice provisions are usually the same as those for regular
meetings, 60 and the flexibility provided by statutes allowing notice to be
governed by corporate bylaws 6 1 obviously may hurt, as well as help, share-
51 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 34 (1957).
52 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244(a) (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.59
(Smith-Hurd 1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §34 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.195(1) (Supp. 1961).
53 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1908.
5 4 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §244(a) (1953); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 156, §43
(1959). Filing may also be with a county judge. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §21(19)
(Supp. 1959).
5 5 HAWAI REV. LAws § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1960) is the only statute requiring
publication following shareholder approval of the reduction. See note 80 infra and
accompanying text. However, publication as a form of notice of the proposed reduc-
tion is found in a number of states. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.230(1), (3) (1949);
S.C. CODE § 12-279 (1952) (only means of notice specified).
Z6 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-229 (1960).
57See, e.g., MicH. ComP. LAWS §450.20 (1948); cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§516(a) (effective Jan. 1, 1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§1701.14(B), .31(b)
(Page Supp. 1961).
58 See text accompanying notes 129-32 infra. As is noted there, this liability
is largely illusory.
59 No director action is contemplated by GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1854 (Supp. 1961);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3223 (1949). Compare KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4206
(1949) (amendment procedure includes board approval).
60 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-706(A) (Supp. 1960) (ten days required
in the case of amendment). There is considerable variance as to the length of
time by which notice must precede the meeting. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-220
(1957) (five days); CAL. CoRP. CODE §2206 (seven); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-3223 (1949) (twenty); ARz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 10-321 (Supp. 1961) (thirty).
Ten days is the most commonly designated period. See 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION
LAW AND PRAcncE § 313, at 414 n.15 (1959).
61 E.g., Micx. Comp. LAws § 450.39 (1948) (no notice required for regular
meeting) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11-2 (1939) (in absence of bylaw, notice of at least
ten days). See also KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3223 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 271.295 (4) (1959).
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holders. Moreover, many statutes permit the failure to give notice to be
overlooked where there has been a waiver-variously defined.62 Absent a
finding of waiver, however, at least one court has set aside the reclassifica-
tion of shares as to a dissenting shareholder.6
The right to vote on the question of reduction is normally controlled
by the ordinary voting provisions of the corporate articles.,, However,
many statutes enfranchise additional classes when their rights or prefer-
ences may be "adversely affected," "altered," or "limited," 65 and several
extend the right to vote on this question regardless of limitations or re-
strictions in the articles.66 Many states require approval by each class,
67
although this may be limited to instances in which amendment is neces-
sary,68 or to classes which may be adversely affected.6 While most states
require only majority approval,7" several recently enacted statutes require
a two-thirds vote.71 On the other hand, Hawaii's requirement of approval
by three-quarters of each class has recently been repealed.72 Some statutes
permit this percentage to be varied by the articles.
7 3
62 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §25-207(d) (Supp. 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156,
§ 28 (1959); Micr. Comp. LAWS § 450.39 (1948).
6 3 Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 510-11, 35 N.E2d
618, 623 (1941).
64Most statutes speak in terms of a vote of those shares "entitled to vote," or
with "voting powers." E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §2 44(a) (1953); MIcir. Com'.
LAws § 450.43 (Supp. 1956).
65 E.g., FLA. STAr. ANN. § 608.18 (1956) (class "adversely affected"); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 156, §41 (1959) ("each class affected); MICH. Comn'. LAWS § 450.43
(Supp. 1956) (class whose "rights, privileges or preferences" will be changed).
Provisions of this sort appear to be primarily aimed at reduction as part of a reclassi-
fication or other realignment of the share structure.
66
E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1904; CONN. GEN. STAT. Rrv. §§ 33-360, -361 (1961);
IOWA CODE ANN. §496A.57 (Supp. 1961); N-v. Rav. STAT. §78.415(1) (1961);
Onxo RE V. CODE ANN. §1701.31(E) (Supp. 1961). Compare VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-64(C) (Supp. 1960). See also Ky. REv. STAT. §.271.460 (1959) ("by such
vote as the articles require . . . not . . . less than a majority of the outstanding
shares").
67 E.g., OHIo R-v. CODE ANN. § 1701.31 (E) (Supp. 1961).
6 8 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§496A.57, .66(3) (Supp. 1961).
69E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.09(3) (1952) (if by amendment); N.Y. STocK
CoRP. LAw §37(1) (c) (3).
70 Absolute majority may be the only express requirement; e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE
§ 1904; DEL. CODE: ANN. tit. 8, § 244(a) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3223
(1949) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803 (effective Jan. 1, 1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2852-706A (Supp. 1960), or may be a permissible alternative minimum when the
articles so state, see statutes cited note 73 infra.
7
1 ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-72(c) (1958) (when amendment neces-
sary) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. R-V. § 33-360(b) (Supp. 1961) (in all cases) ; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.53(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961) (if amendment necessary);
OHIO Rrv. CODE ANN. § 1701.31 (E) (Page Supp. 1961) (in all cases calling for
shareholder approval). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11-2 (1937).
72 See HAwAII REV. LAWS § 172-52(b) (Supp. 1960).
7 3 E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-107, -604 (1957) (absolute majority or greater);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1816, -1854 (Supp. 1961) (two-thirds unless charter provides
otherwise); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-149 (1948) (two-thirds unless articles provide
otherwise).
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B. The Protection of Creditors
Creditors may be protected either by strict requirements concerning
the retention of sufficient capital to meet liabilities 74 or by notice provi-
sions.75  Although many statutes require some sort of publication,76 only
one of the more recently enacted ones contains this requirement. 77  Not
even the civil or criminal liability for fraud, misrepresentation, or non-
compliance imposed by many statutes may offer effective protection to
creditors in many cases.78 Although Michigan requires that notice be
mailed to unsecured creditors 7 9 it provides no procedure by which creditors
may enjoin a withdrawal of assets. Hawaii is alone in providing that in
certain cases the state officer shall publish notice of the proposed reduction
and consider timely objections before reaching his decision.80
IV. LIMrTATIoNs ON REDUCTION OF CAPITAL
Limitations on reduction of capital fall into three categories. These
include largely illusory provisions concerning the minimum capital after
reduction, requirement of certain accounting procedures, and, most im-
portant, limitations on the distribution of assets released from capital by
reduction.
A. Minimum Capital and Accounting Procedures
Although the lower limit of capital reduction most often coincides
with the statutory minimum required for incorporation,1 a few statutes
appear to demand greater protection for the interests of creditors and
preferred shareholders.82 There is, however, much disagreement as to how
these interests should properly be safeguarded. The concept of protection
74 See text accompanying notes 81-98, 103-18 infra.
75 See note 80 infra and accompanying text
'16 E.g., DEL. CODE A'NN. tit. 8, § 244(e) (Supp. 1960) ; N.J. STAT. ArNc. § 14:11-5
(1937) ; cf. HAWAII REv. LAWS § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1960).
77 The Model Act and states that have adopted it have no requirement of publi-
cation. But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 244(e) (Supp. 1960) (readoption of the
provision in 1955).
78 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 32,
§9 157.100, .101 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Micr. Coup. LAWS §§ 450.49, .50 (1948); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 14:11-5 (1937); N.Y. STOcx CORP. LAW § 61.
The generally ineffective American statutes are in direct contrast to the British
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 66-71, which provides for strict control
by the courts and affords an opportunity for creditors to be notified directly and
alleged threats to their rights considered. See Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 562 (1935), for
a discussion of the British system in its earlier form.
79 MICH. CoMp. LAWS §9 450.20, .43 (1948).
80 HAvAII REV. LAWS § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1960). This procedure applies when
reduction is to be effected by release of subscriptions, retirement or decrease of par
shares. Exceptions must be raised within thirty days.
81 See, e.g., MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 41 (1959) ($1000).
82 See HvAIr REv. LAWS § 172.52(a) (Supp. 1960). This is similar to statutory
requirements of equality among shareholders upon distribution of assets. See, e.g.,
LA. RRv. STAT. § 12:46A (1950).
1962]
732 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:723
can be distorted when, as is done in some states as the minimum is put in
terms of the aggregate par value (or stated value in the case of no-par
shares) of the shares which remain outstanding after the reduction. Such
a minimum, when not coupled with a restriction on asset distribution, is
illusory as to creditors because of the possibility that the buffer which
capital affords them may be almost completely removed. Only a few states
place a restriction on the liability-to-capital ratio. Moreover, a class with
liquidation preference may also find itself without the protection for which
it bargained 85 While this last objection is met to some degree by statutes
requiring that the capital remaining after reduction include allowance for
any preferential amount that might be payable in the event of involuntary
liquidation,8 real protection for the various interests mentioned will only
be given by limiting the possible applications of the amount resulting from
reduction.
Accounting problems arise from the fact that, whatever the final dis-
position intended for the funds released by reduction, both accounting prac-
tice and statutory language require that they be classified, at least tem-
porarily. Depending upon the terminology of the statute, the newly freed
fund is designated "reduction surplus," 8 7 "capital surplus," 88 "paid-in
surplus," 89 or merely "surplus." 90 But the problem is more than just that
of assigning a label; particular legal incidents devolve from the terms used.
If the funds released are considered a part of a general surplus account
from which regular dividends may subsequently be paid, any restriction on
the distribution of capital is in effect nullified,9' despite the fact that restric-
tions at this stage are supposedly the primary means by which creditors
are protected. While several important incorporation statutes continue to
make no distinction as to the source of surplus,9 2 a recognition of the im-
portance of this function has led a majority of jurisdictions to require
segregation.
9 3
83 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-604 (1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1854 (Supp.
1961); Oio REV. CODE AiN. § 1701.31 (Page Supp. 1961).
84 Only two states afford any real limitation. See MONT. REV. CODE § 15-212
(1947) (capital is not to be reduced below the amount of total indebtedness) ; S.D.
CODE § 11.0205 (1939) (not below indebtedness or estimated cost of works which it
may be the purpose of the corporation to construct).
85 See generally Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1203 (1952).
s6 .g., CA. CORP. CODE § 1904; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.60 (Smith-Hurd
1954) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.195 (1932); N.Y. Bus. COR. LAw §§ 516(b), 806(3)
(effective Jan. 1, 1963); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-355(b) (1958).
S E.g., CAL. CoR. CODE § 1906; TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 4.13 (1956).
88 E.g., ALAsKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-82 (Supp. 1958); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 36(b) (1957) ; ABA-AlI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 64 (1953).
89 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.60, .02(l) (Smith-Hurd 1954); MicH.
ComP. LAws §§ 450.20, .43 (1948).
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 170(a), 173 (1953) (semble); MIcH. Comp.
LAws §§ 450.22, .43 (Supp. 1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§14:8-19, :11-5 (1937)
(semble).
91 See Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital Stock,
2 Oio ST. L.J. 220, 227 (1936).
92 See note 90 mipra.
9 3 Usually under the designation of "capital surplus." See 2 ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 64, 12.02 (1960).
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To the extent that capital was already impaired, reduction will result
in no surplus; the effect will be merely to arrive at a new, lower level of
legal capital, reflecting the impact of past losses. Nevertheless, an earned
surplus balance can exist despite the presence of a deficit caused by extra-
ordinary losses.P4 If deficit writeoff can be accomplished without reflecting
any change in the earned surplus account, reduction may pave the way
for continued dividends "out of earnings" and the creation of an illusion of
profitability. In order to preclude such manipulation a number of statutes
contain the further requirements that reduction surplus be used to erase
an existing deficit only after retained earnings are exhausted in that effort,95
and that there be disclosure of these operations on the corporate financial
statements and to shareholders.9 6 Only two states make mandatory the
recommended accounting practice 97 that deficit writeoff be reflected on the
balance sheet for a number of years.98
B. Limitations on the Distribution of Assets
Unless reduction was effected only to cure an existing deficit or im-
pairment, a favorable balance of net assets will result. The common law
evolved the approach that, so long as the corporation was solvent, this
surplus, usually called "capital surplus," could be-and, according to some
decisions, must be 19 -- distributed among existing shareholders. 00 Recog-
nition of the fact that distribution amounted to a partial liquidation has led
to the conclusion that asset, and not dividend, preferences should control
allocation."0 " Here the legislative tendency has been to enlarge the area of
94 See Comm. on ACCOUNTING PROCEDuRE, AMERIcAN INST. OF ACCOUNTANTS,
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BuLL. No. 48, BUSINESS ComBINATIONS (1957) ("quasi-
reorganizations").
95 See ALAsKA Coip. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-82 (Supp. 1958); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, §§ 25, 36(b) (1957) ; N.D. CENTURY CODE § 10-19-71 (1960) ; ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 57.411 (1961); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT § 4.13 (1956). The recently enacted New
York statute in addition requires ownership approval. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 517(a) (4) (effective Jan. 1, 1963).
96E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1910; MD. ANn. CODE art. 23, §§ 25, 36(b) (1957);
MIcH. CouP. LAws §450.22 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §516(c),
517(a) (4) (effective Jan. 1, 1963).
9 7 See KARENBROCK & SimoNs, INTEMuEDIATE ACCOUNTING 663-64 (3d ed. 1958).
98 OHIo REv. CODE ANx. § 1701.32(F) (Page Supp. 1961) (five years); PA.
STAT. ANwN. tit. 15, § 2852-704C (Supp. 1961) (ten years).
99 See Seeley v. New York Nat'1 Exch. Bank, 8 Daly 400 (N.Y.C.P. 1878),
aff'd, 78 N.Y. 608 (1879) (directors have no discretion to withhold reduction surplus).
100 See Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 13 (1906) ; Strong
v. Brooklyn Cross-town R.R., 93 N.Y. 426 (1883) ; cf. Jerome v. Cogswell, 204 U.S. 1
(1907); Continental Sec. Co. v. Northern Sec. Co., 66 N.J. Eq. 274, 57 Atl. 876
(Ch. 1904). Compare Benas v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 216 Mo. App. 53, 267 S.W.
28 (1924). Several courts have suggested that there are equitable limitations on
distribution. See Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215
(Ch.) (dictum), aff'd sb nom. Murphy v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 506,
39 A.2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944) ; William C. Atwater & Co. v. Fall River Poca-
hontas Collieries Co., 115 W. Va. 745, 178 S.E. 73 (1934) (dictum) (actual value).
101 See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., sipra note 100.
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managerial discretion so that a corporation may distribute or withhold
reduction surpluses otherwise distributable. 0 2
The opposite problem concerns restrictions on corporate power to dis-
tribute capital surplus. These are mostly statutory in origin, and vary
from state to state. The most common minimum standard for the dis-
tribution of assets pursuant to reduction is the requirement that the cor-
poration remain solvent after the distribution has taken place.10 3  In some
states, "equity solvency" is coupled with the objective tests of balance sheet
solvency'-0 or impairment. 0 5  Some states demand the more explicit
requirement that assets exceed liabilities plus capital as reduced 106 (or, net
assets must exceed stated capital) .107 Several states call for no more than
an excess of assets over liabilities 10s or assets over reduced capital; 109
some make no stipulation whatsoever." 0D The shortcomings of such "safe-
guards" are almost self-evident; the creditor does not want to find himself
suddenly dealing with a barely solvent corporation. Nor does capital offer
102 See N.Y. STocK CoRP. LAw §36(4) (c) ; Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage
Corp., 291 N.Y. 227, 52 N.E.2d 108 (1943) (avoiding the result of the Seeley case,
cited in note 99 supra). Compare CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1906; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§§ 157.41a, .60a(3) (Smith-Hurd 1954), as to specificity and treatment of preferences.
It has been suggested that the ability of courts to interject considerations of fair
treatment depends on the specificity of the statutory distribution provisions. See
Note, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1203, 1211 (1952). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)
(1953). For discussion and criticism of the "distribution in partial liquidation"
provisions recently adopted by a number of states, see Hackney, The Financial Pro-
visions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. Rsv. 1357, 1388-89,
1402-05 (1957) ; Seward, Sources of Distributions to Stockholders, 5 BAYLOR L. RLv.
242, 251, 254 (1953); Note, supra at 1215-17. See generally 1 ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus.
CoRP. ACT ANN. § 41 (1960). Many states expressly provide that any part of the sur-
plus resulting from reduction may be used to reduce or eliminate a deficit which has
arisen as a result of prior losses. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.32(F)
(Page Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.61(3) (1957); cf. N.Y. SToCK CoRP.
LAw §36(4)(c). Prior authorization by the shareholders may be required. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-704C (Supp. 1961). Among these "losses" against
which the surplus may be applied, some statutes even include the diminution of asset
value. See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1910; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.60a(1)
(Smith-Hurd 1954) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.210(2) (1949) ; NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.445
(Supp. 1959).
103E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-357 (1958); MIcH. ComP. LAws
§450.23a(a) (Supp. 1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-703(1) (1958); VA.
CODE ANN. §13.1-43(a) (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.39(1) (1957). Some
statutes add a "reasonable grounds to believe" qualification to the basic requirement.
See Onio Rxv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.33 (Page Supp. 1961); cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit 18, § 1.135 (1951).
104 See, e.g., CAL. Cor'. CoDE § 1907 (fair present value of assets must equal
at least one and one-quarter times liabilities) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.460(2) (1958)
(proposed reduction must not reduce fair value of assets to an amount less than
liabilities).
105 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-211 (1960) ; MD. ANN. CODE art 23, §§ 37(a)2,
74(a)4 (1957).
106See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.18(6) (1956); N.Y. STocK CoRP. LAW
§ 38(6).
107 See, e.g., IDAHO ANN. CODE §§ 30-130(4), -149(2) (1948).
108 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, §76 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§351.195(6) (Supp. 1961) ("not otherwise provided for"; also assets to exceed
reduced capital).
109 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-604 (1957) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-161, -175
(1954).
110 E.g., Alabama, Arizona.
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any protection in the absence of a meaningful limit on reduction."' Fur-
thermore, inasmuch as few jurisdictions require consideration of "actual" 11
or "fair" 113 value in determining the availability of a surplus for distribu-
tion purposes, inflated book values may render the statutory protection com-
pletely hollow. Nor has any statute expressly demanded control based on
standards of liquidity, despite the likelihood that a distribution will normally
be of cash or other current items rather than something less readily divi-
sible, such as land, buildings, or machinery.114 While consideration of both
valuation and liquidity may be implied in the usual safeguard of equity
solvency, the implication is at best vague." 5 Many of these objections are
met by statutes like California's or Hawaii's. The former requires a five-
to-four fair value asset-to-liability ratio in addition to the board's deter-
mination of solvency." 6 Hawaii requires both that the value of remaining
assets equals new par value and that asset values equal twice the corporate
indebtedness.1 7 Both Montana and South Dakota achieve similar effect
by requiring that stated capital be in excess of liabilities," 8 thus assuring a
minimum asset amount at least twice as large as that of liabilities.
Another kind of limitation on the distribution of assets is based on a
consideration of the respective rights of different shareholder groups fo a
reduction surplus. In those statutes which make no distinction as to the
nature of surplus, distribution will fall within the bounds of ordinary
dividend provisions, allocation among preferred and junior classes being
governed by the corporate articles." 9 Some other states reach this same
result even though surplus from reduction must be segregated.120 The
status of preferred shares is further enhanced in the several states which
in effect limit any distribution to preferred,12 ' and to a lesser extent in those
where full payment of cumulative dividends in arrears must precede any
1 1 1 See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
11 2 See LA. REv. STAT. § 12:45(B) (1950); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 38(6)
(the new Business Corporation Law deletes this qualification).
113 See IDAHO CODE A'N. § 30-149(2) (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.460(2)
(1958) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.39 (3) (Supp. 1961).
"14 See Callahan, supra note 91, at 228-32, 238-39.
1 15 See Legislation, 47 HARv. L. REv. 693, 696-97 (1934).
16 CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 1907, 1908. See also ORA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.133
(1953) (5:4 ratio).
"17 IAwAu REV. LAws § 172-52(g) (Supp. 1960).
118 MoNT. REv. CODE § 15-212 (1955); S.D. CODE § 11.0205 (Supp. 1960).
119 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §170(a) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.3501A (1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:8-19 (1939); text accompanying notes
91-93 upra.
120 The requirement may be that there be no distribution to one class in violation
of the equal or prior rights of others, e.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 64-604 (1957) ; OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.33 (Page Supp. 1961); cf. CAL. CoRP'. CODE § 1906(b), or
that distribution be in accord with the charter, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.18(6) (1956).
See also text accompanying notes 81-86 supra.
121 Eg., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-917 (b) (1961) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1954); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1906; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 301.22 (2)
(1947).
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general distribution.12 2 These restrictions, however, are oriented toward
dividend preferences. This tends to overlook the fact that a distribution
from reduction surplus more closely resembles a liquidation. Asset prefer-
ences should not be disregarded. The threat of possible inequity is some-
what alleviated in some states by a provision that no distribution to any
class may reduce remaining net assets below the aggregate of liquidation
preferences.2 3 But even this type of safeguard allows for erosion of the
buffer protecting asset-preference shareholders. 124 Inequity might be pre-
vented by a requirement that the method of distribution be stipulated by
the plan of reduction, with provision for a meaningful class vote. While
this requirement would provide shareholder protection, it is almost as in-
flexible as a denial of all distribution of reduction surplus. Hence the best
solution seems to be that these distributions be treated as liquidation
dividends.1 2 5
V. REMEDIES
As has been previously noted, the statutory provisions concerning re-
duction of capital offer little in the way of effective remedies to persons
damaged by an illegal reduction,2 6 nor does the requirement in some states
that reduction must be approved by a state official 12 guarantee that the
rights of shareholders or creditors will be protected.
Statutory redress for illegal distribution most commonly takes the
form of director or shareholder-recipient liability; 128 however, these pro-
visions have been drawn in terms which render their protection attenuated.
Thus, the directors' good faith, nonnegligent finding that a distribution
is legal, however mistaken, will usually absolve them,129 and reliance on the
book value of assets is often designated sufficient care.130 Only a few states
require a showing of reasonable grounds for a belief that the distribution
122 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-355(b) (Supp. 1961); ILL.. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.60 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-703 (1958).
'3See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.60a(3), .41a (Smith-Hurd 1954);
MicH. ComP. LAWS § 450.23a (Supp. 1956) ; PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 2852-703 (1958).
124 Cf. Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1952).
125 See id. at 1216; text accompanying note 101 mtpra.
126 See note 78 vipra and accompanying text.
127 .g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-285 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157.59 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ; MrIC. ComP. LAws § 450.5, .43 (Supp. 1956) ; cf. GA.
CoDE ANN. §§ 22-1818, -1854 (Supp. 1961) (examined by judge and if found lawful
he shall grant the order).
128.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §825; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-707 (1958); see
note 132 infra.
129 E.g., ALAsxA Comp. LAWS § 36-2A-51 (Supp. 1958) ; CA. CoRP. CODE § 1907.
But see MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 37 (1959). Compare IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-251
(1960) (knowingly and wilfully); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, §§ 38, 39 (Supp.
1961) (criminal penalty).
130 E.g., D . CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 172 (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42
(Smith-Hurd 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-707 (1958).
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would not be unlawful. 131 Shareholders are even less likely to be pursued
for their receipt of such distributions. 132 The usual basis for liability is that
the shareholder knew of the impropriety -13 and, in a number of states,
unless no director is responsible, his liability is limited to contribution
after the determination of the directors' liability.134 In any event, recovery
is limited to the amount received which exceeds what would have been
lawful.135 Moreover, in some states action may be brought only by the
corporation, 13 6 and a short statute of limitations often applies.' 37  Finally, it
is improbable that a sufficiently large number of shareholders or directors
could be joined-forgetting for the moment the great expense involved in
attempting this-to yield a significant recovery.138  In all, the prospects of
adequate creditor protection through these techniques-their desirability
aside-seems very slim indeed.
Nor have the courts, on the whole, been willing to probe deeply into
the propriety of reduction or distribution in order to grant relief to share-
holder or creditor. On the other hand, when franchise taxes are measured
by the amount of stated capital, the courts have permitted the state to
assert any procedural omission in the reduction process. 39
In the main, cases dealing with planned or executed reduction involved
an examination of the peripheral matters of method, procedure, or the al-
location of the resulting surplus, although the doctrine of "strict com-
-31. See N.Y. STocK CORP. LAw § 58; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.95 (Page
Supp. 1961); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 1.133 (1953). Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 717, 719 (effective Jan. 1, 1963); de Capriles & McAniff, The Financial
Provisim of the New (1961) New York Bisiness Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1239, 1256, 1271 (1961).
132 West Virginia appears to be the only state which explicitly holds the recipients
of any distribution of surplus created by reduction liable for payment of then existing
debts of the corporation. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3026 (1961) ; cf. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-3-18 (1953) (liable if director fails to publish notice) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11-5
(1937) (liable if proper publication is not made); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 362
(1958) (liable for dividends out of capital).
'33 E.g., CAL. Cop. CODE § 1510; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.95 (C) (Page
Supp. 1961). But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-131 (1948), Compare PA. STAT. ANN.
tit 15, § 2852-707 (1958) (necessary to show knowledge only when corporation is
not insolvent after the distribution).
'34 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.275(2) (b) (1959); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:27B
(1951).
135 See, e.g., statutes cited note 134 vtpra; cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-321,
-359 (1960).
136 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-131 (1948); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.95(C)
(Page Supp. 1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 2852-707 (1958) ; cf. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1510 (corporation, receiver, liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy).
1
37 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1953) (six years from payment); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3506 (1949) (two years from payment) ; MIcH. ComP. LAws
§ 450.48 (Supp. 1956) (three years from payment); cf. Chisnell v. Ozier Co., 140
Ohio St. 355, 44 N.E.2d 464 (1942) (construing Ohio's two-year statute as applying
only to derivative actions).
138 This is particularly true when shares are widely held. Director liability is
usually joint and several, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 825; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-
707 (1958), but authority to join shareholders is rarely clarified by statute. But cf.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1510.
19 See State v. Stewart Bros. Cotton Co., 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939);
A. B. Frank Co. v. Latham, 145 Tex. 30, 193 S.W.2d 671 (1946) (citing cases in
other jurisdictions).
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pliance" has been used on occasion to protect shareholders or creditors.1 4
Considering the permissive attitude embodied in most statutes it is under-
standable that-assumning compliance with the appropriate prescriptions-
decisional law is virtually mute on the basic question of a corporation's
power to reduce its capital. Courts have been loath to weigh-or even
mention-the possibility that bona fide business reasons do not underlie a
plan of reduction; even when they have expressed doubt as to purpose, it
has most often been in the context of enjoining a particular method of
achieving reduction.1 1 An allegation of fraud or the grossest abuse of the
statutory permission is required before the courts will examine the purpose
of a reduction when there has been prima facie compliance with the
statute. 4 2 Schemes in which the avowed purpose was to buy out a
minority "adverse to management," 143 or to permit a dominant shareholder
to gain control of management 14 have all been upheld. While a Washing-
ton court did speak of looking closely into a duly adopted plan whose
purpose was to write off a deficit, it was satisfied to let the plan stand once
it determined that it seemed "probable" no loss to a class of shareholders
would result.14 5
The rights of shareholders to equitable treatment in reduction have
received much judicial attention. When faced with express statutory au-
thority for reduction but silence as to permissible methods, several courts
have implied authority for resort to amendment or reacquisition of shares
to achieve the purpose.146 However, this was not a grant of unbridled
authority to use those or other methods. With injunctive relief as their
main vehicle, courts have interposed requirements to assure that fair treat-
ment be given the different classes of shareholders. Early pronouncements
were in terms of strict equality; any reduction not treating shareholders
alike was void as to a dissenter.147  In the light of increased statutory
140 "Strict compliance" is most often asserted to defeat the effect of a withdrawal
from capital in cases where there had not even been a colorable attempt to comply
with the statutory procedure. See, e.g., King Mach. Co. v. Caporaso, 2 N.J. Super.
230, 63 A.2d 270 (Ch. 1949).
141 See, e.g., Theis v. Durr, 125 Wis. 651, 104 N.W. 985 (1905) ; cf. Wessel v.
Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215 (Ch.), aff'd sub norn. Murphy
v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 506, 39 A.2d 431 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944);
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P.2d 1 (1936).
142 See cases cited notes 143-45 infra.
143 See Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d
295 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
144 See Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 193 Fed. 825 (3d Cir. 1912).
'45 See Hay v. Big Bend Land Co., 32 Wash. 2d 887, 902, 204 P.2d 488, 497
(1949).
146 See Security Nat'l Bank v. Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., 145 Kan. 899, 67 P.2d 527
(1937) (reacquisition-now express in KAN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 17-3224G (1949));
Haggard v. Lexington Util. Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 84 (1935) (amendment);
Germarm v. Farmers Tobacco Warehouse Co., 260 Ky. 249, 84 S.W.2d 82 (1935)
(reacquisition-now Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.135 (1959)).
147 E.g., Niagara Shoe Co. v. Tobey, 71 Ill. App. 250 (1897) ; Currier v. Lebanon
Slate Co., 56 N.H. 262 (1875); Page v. American & British Mfg. Co., 129 App. Div.
346, 113 N.Y. Supp. 734 (1908) ; Theis v. Durr, 125 Wis. 651, 104 N.W. 985 (1905).
But see Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 193 Fed. 825 (3d Cir. 1912).
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liberality and provision for express safeguards-especially those of enu-
merated methods,148 class voting,149 and appraisal rights 15°--equity has
retreated from the absolute view to a more subjective standard which
allows for some inequality so long as there is no oppression of minority
interests. This has resulted not only in diverse concepts of "fairness" 'r'
but also in problems of construing the applicability of the legislative checks
-especially when they are couched in terms of "altering" or "adversely
affecting" class incidents.
1 52
When the rights of creditors have been affected, a number of courts
have, at least verbally, leaned away from permissiveness. This approach
may be seen in the treatment of cases where one of the effects of capital
reduction was to shrink the basis for an inchoate statutory liability of a
bank's directors and shareholders.153 However, these cases can be more
readily explained by the proposition that literal compliance would be of no
avail because of alleged insolvency at the time of reduction. Moreover,
creditors who become such after a "valid" reduction for questionable busi-
ness purposes cannot void the reduction by questioning motive.' On the
other hand, failure to follow filing or publication procedures designed to
protect creditors has been held to permit an injured creditor to avoid the
effect of reduction and any distribution following it. 55 Likewise, methods
148 See text accompanying notes 24-49 supra; Martin v. American Potash &
Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
149 See text accompanying notes 64-73 supra. See generally Dodd, Dissenting
Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (pts. 1-2), 75 U. PA. L. Rxv.
585, 723 (1927); Note, 69 HmAv. L. REv. 538, 544-45 (1956).
150 N.Y. STocx CoRP. LAW § 38(11) is clearest of the few statutes which allow
appraisal in the case of amendments. See generally Dodd, supra note 149; Levy,
Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420
(1930) ; Note, supra note 149, at 544. The breadth of New York's provision is shown
in Matter of Kinney, 279 N.Y. 423, 18 N.E.2d 645 (1939), 52 HARV. L. REv. 1011
(1939), and In re Seiler, 239 App. Div. 400, 267 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1933), 19 CORNELL
L.Q. 470 (1934).
151 See Note, supra note 149, at 545-51; Note, 65 HARV. L. Rxv. 1203 (1952).
Compare Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200 (Ch.
1943), aff'd, 134 N.J. Eq. 359, 35 A.2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944), with Sander
v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 36 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.J. 1940).
152Compare Sterling v. 16 Park Avenue, Inc., 132 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct.),
nodified on other grounds, 284 App. Div. 1033, 136 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1954) (reduction
of par value adversely affected shareholder so as to require class voting privilege),
with Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 26 Del. Ch. 411,
24 A.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (amendment authorizing a new class of preferred stock
does not alter or change any special right of common shareholders enabling them to
vote separately), and Haggard v. Lexington Util. Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 84
(1935) (class voting).
153 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Banking Corp., 83 Mont. 581, 273 Pac. 1055 (1929);
Grigsby v. Ainsworth, 13 Tenn. App. 372 (1930).
154 See, e.g., In re State Ins. Co., 14 Fed. 28 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1882); Greene v.
Boardman, 143 Misc. 201, 256 N.Y. Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd mem., 240 App.
Div. 745, 265 N.Y. Supp. 965 (1933) (to cure impairment caused by unlawful dis-
tribution of assets to shareholders) ; Shaw v. Noyes, 13 SAV.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) (to reduce basis for statutory assessment). In Greene it was found or admitted
that plaintiff had become a creditor with knowledge.
155 See, e.g., In re Bell Tone Records, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 806 (D.N.J. 1949);
Shaw v. Lewis, 126 Tex. 248, 86 S.W.2d 741 (1935) ; cf. Sheffield v. Norris, 235 La.
667. 105 So. 2d 260 (1958).
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of reduction such as reacquisition with intent to retire, when not expressly
permitted by statute, have been disallowed and restitution ordered because
they cause a withdrawal of assets in a manner which afforded creditors no
notice.156  These same faults may be overlooked when raised by share-
holders or the corporation, 157 but there have been instances when a court's
treatment of shareholder-corporation interests has been colored by an
awareness that nonparty creditors might be adversely affected. 1 58
The formal safeguards accorded by various statutes have been con-
strued as contemplating only remedial action for the protection of creditors.
Thus, a creditor is probably unable to enjoin the filing of a planned reduc-
tion by a state official;159 mandamus has been allowed to issue despite
qualms on the part of administrative officers as to the merit of a request for
approval, and the issues confined to the face of the statement. 60 These
rulings are somewhat offset by decisions stating that prior approval wil
carry no weight if it later turns out that the reduction was in fact un-
lawful. 161 However, the result of this judicial attitude is that unsecured
creditors are left to fend for themselves amid the vagaries of bankruptcy
or insolvency proceedings. Here they are pitted against distributees of
allegedly illegally withdrawn assets-some of whom hold evidences of in-
debtedness themselves-, and the posture of the parties at the time of in-
solvency becomes crucial. 16 2  Aside from the difficulties which may arise
in ascertaining when insolvency occurred,16 the ability of an unsatisfied
156 See, e.g., Tait v. Pigott, 32 Wash. 344, 73 Pac. 364 (1903) (corporation
while solvent repurchased shares for cash from defendant). But cf. Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937) ; Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby
Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935). Compare Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah
132, 59 P.2d 1 (1936).
'57 See Williams v. Davis, 297 Ky. 626, 180 S.W.2d 874 (1944) ; Meisenheimer v.
Alexander, 162 N.C. 226, 78 S.E. 161 (1913). But cf. Randle v. Winona Coal Co.,
206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790 (1921). Compare Uffelman v. Boillin, 19 Tenn. App. 1,
82 S.W.2d 545 (1935) (strict compliance with requirement that amendment and
reduction be filed separately).
158 See Sheffield v. Norris, 235 La. 667, 105 So. 2d 260 (1958); Benas v. Title
Guar. Trust Co., 216 Mo. App. 53, 267 S.W. 28 (1924); cf. Germann v. Farmers
Tobacco Warehouse Co., 260 Ky. 249, 84 S.W.2d 82 (1935).
'59 See Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital Stock,
2 OHIo ST. L.J. 220, 236 (1936); cf. Schoenfeld v. American Can Co., 55 Atl. 1044
(NJ. Ch. 1903).
160 See Dominguez Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196 Cal. 468, 238 Pac. 703 (1925);
cf. State ex rel. Radio Corp. of America v. Benson, 32 Del. 576, 128 Atl. 107 (1924).
161 See, e.g., Grigsby v. Ainsworth, 13 Tenn. App. 372 (1930) ; Shaw v. Lewis,
126 Tex. 248, 86 S.W.2d 74 (1935).
162 See, e.g., Kassler v. Kyle, 28 Colo. 374, 65 Pac. 34 (1901) ; Campbell v. Grant
Trust & Say. Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N.E. 267 (1932) ; Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby
Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935); Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a
Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697, 701-04,
728-33 (1941). Distinctions are often made between existing creditors, subsequent
creditors, those with knowledge, ones who relied, and the like. See notes 153-54
supra and accompanying text. Federal courts usually disregard these distinctions in
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir.
1935) (time of payment controls); In re Bell Tone Records, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 806,
810 (D.N.J. 1949) (citing cases).
163 Beside the proof problem, there may be one of definition: Is the term being
used in the "equity" or "bankruptcy" sense? See notes 103-18 supra and accompanying
text.
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creditor to recover has been further limited by the predilection of some
courts to overlook substance in favor of the form of a withdrawal "out of
capital." 64 In the area of shareholder liability for receipt of unlawful
distributions from reduction surplus, there is only one reported case effec-
tively extending a creditor's ability to be made whole,16 5 and in that case it
took a liberal reading of the statute of limitations provision to put teeth in
Ohio's "reasonable grounds to believe" basis for liability.166
VI. CONCLUSION
Neither courts nor legislatures have faced the problems involved in the
reduction of capital with any consistent awareness of the dangers which
this procedure poses for shareholders or creditors. Once it is agreed that
there are justifications for reduction sufficient to overbalance its dangers in
certain circumstances, it is the legislature which must draft a program that
will guarantee that the procedure will not be abused. At the same time,
these guarantees must not be couched in such rigid terms that reduction
is either impossible or unworkable. Ballantine has remarked that the legis-
latures face a dilemma in drafting a corporation law
liberal enough to facilitate business transactions without undue
formalities of checks and balances, of votes and consents of the
shareholders, and applications to courts, and at the same time not
so lax that the management or the majority may manipulate the
machinery to the prejudice of creditors or investors or the oppres-
sion of minority shareholders... 167
Escape from this dilemma lies neither in complete permissiveness nor in a
statute so detailed in its provisions as to meet every possible situation. The
best solution seems, rather, to be the creation of explicit statutory refer-
ences to a standard of business exigency. Within the present statutory
framework this would add a measure of safety without sacrificing any
existing protection. Enforcement could be had even within the usual provi-
sion that a state official "shall file if the statement conforms to law."
Existing law would be changed in that a more demanding standard would
be set and the corporation's consideration of it would appear in the record.
The opportunity of an existing creditor to object at this preliminary stage,
although arguably desirable as a means for increasing creditor protection,
164 This is particularly true of the Massachusetts court's treatment of repurchase
cases. See, e.g., Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935) ;
cf. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937);
Barrett v. W. A. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931). Com-
pare Small v. Sullivan, 245 N.Y. 343, 157 N.E. 261 (1927) ; Tait v. Pigott, 32 Wash.
344, 73 Pac. 364 (1903).
165 See Chisnell v. Ozier Co., 140 Ohio St. 355, 44 N.E.2d 464 (1942).
166 The case construed provisions which are now clarified and contained in OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.95 (Page Supp. 1961).
167 Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19
CAi.F. L. REV. 465 (1931).
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could result in a cumbrous system unnecessary in most cases so long as
the standard is meaningful. The effectiveness of the suggested procedure
in safeguarding the interests of creditors, shareholders and the public lies
in the fact that it permits reduction only when a disinterested party has
determined that use of that device may be beneficial. Where business
exigency exists, the primary aims of the corporation, its shareholders, and
its creditors should coincide. In any event this method for determining
the propriety of reduction would avoid both the rigor of proposals for the
outright denial of withdrawals from capital 168 and the undue laxity of much
of the present law.
H. M. J.
168 See Kessler, Share Repurchases under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FoRD-
HAm L. REv. 637, 683-88 (1960) ; Legislation, 47 HnAv. L. REv. 693, 698 (1934).
